religions such as Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism developed into localized Cambodian variants. 18 The Hinduized Angkor temples that the Khmer rulers had originally built as monuments devoted to the Hindu god Vishnu became Theravada Buddhist sites. In only a few centuries, the Indian influence on Cambodian society was localized to form something recognized as a uniquely Cambodian form. Extant ideas, rites, and practices ultimately joined with exogenous influences to become something that became particular to a region, culture, or people.
Indeed, Mao Zedong's "Sinification" of Marxism provides us with a recent example of a process whereby endogenous ideas blended with foreign concepts to create a localized form within a particular context. The "Sinification" of Marxism was Mao's attempt to adapt the universality of Marxism to China's particular national and cultural forms. The problem was that many Chinese intellectuals viewed Marxism as "a foreign dogma that was hostile to the essence of Chinese culture," thus making its widespread acceptance an enormous obstacle. 19 To counter, Mao's qualification of Friedrich Engels' formulation of historical materialism "suggested that an ideology which has its roots in social, economic and political circumstances vastly different from those that existed in China must be modified if it was to serve as templates and guides to actions." 20 Mao's own modification of this existing Marxist formula was the first major step towards localizing Marxist ideology to suit China's historical context.
The next important step was Mao's proposal in 1938 for the "Sinification of Marxism," which referred to the specific ways in which the foreign theory of Marxism-Leninism could be adapted to the concrete historical realities of modern China. 21 These "realities," as Raymond Wylie notes, included the under-development of capitalism, the absence of a large urban proletariat, and the central role of the rural peasantry. 22 He quotes Mao as stating that "[i]n the first stage of this complex process of interaction, new Marxist contents will fuse with traditional national forms, but the process will not terminate at this point but will instead progress to a second stage in which the interaction of content and form will transform the traditional forms into modern forms. "23 The final product, Mao states, will be a "distinctive culture that represents the total integration of modern Marxist (scientific) contents and modern national forms." 24 In so doing, Mao implemented "a strong ethos" and "a clear sense of a separate Chinese identity" to domesticate, militarize, and nationalize revolution in China. 25 An important approach to the problem of ideas across cultures arises from the scholarly debate over the formulation of "Chinese" Marxism, or Marxism that was adaptable to China's environment. Central to this debate are efforts to identify Chinese Marxism as ideological continuity or divergence,
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A somewhat related position comes forward from Cold War historians Karl Wittfogel and Robert North, who state that Mao Zedong was primarily interested in applying a Soviet model to China's unique historical context. 36 Their assertion appears tenable given the CCP's close relationship with the Soviets and their participation in the Comintern. 37 As Meisner states, however, the relationship between Stalin and Mao was very tense from as early as 1927 since Mao's meteoric rise to atop the Communist Party hierarchy came "in direct conflict with CCP factions backed by Stalin." 38 Lee Feigon supports this claim, stating that Mao realized that "he had made a mistake in trying to follow a Soviet model for China" and spent "two decades of his life trying to tear China away from the Soviet road." 39 Mao broke with the "consensus politics of the Stalinists" to weaken the heavily bureaucratic Party, which the pro-Russian Returned Scholars used as a device to dictate the CCP's direction. 40 A third line of interpretation argued by Nick Knight, by contrast, returns the focus to the continuity of ideas, thereby taking Mao's devotion to orthodox Marxism seriously. 41 Knight argues that Mao attempted to "establish a formula by which a universal theory such as Marxism could be utilized in a particular national context and culture without abandoning the universality of that theory." 42 But how does this argument account for the obvious process of localizing Marxism within China? Arif Dirlik asserts that Maoism represents less of an orthodoxy per se, and more of "a local or vernacular version of a universal Marxism [that] was very much a product of the globalization of Marxism outside Europe." 43 Mao's Sinification was thus not a question of elevating Chinese peculiarities above Marxian universals or the other way around, although Mao's nationalism as well as his internationalism are certainly apparent in "On New Democracy." Rather, Mao's Marxism was an ideological endpoint; it was the step toward becoming a complete ideology where the particular (China) worked in concert with the universal (Marxism). Thus, Sinification represents a naturalization, or localization, of Marxism in a particular setting. 44 In summation, Mao Zedong created a formula by which the universal theory of Marxism was applicable in a particular national context without the abandonment of the universality of Marxian theory. 45 The marriage of universal Marxian laws to particular laws that described China's unique characteristics created a genuinely Chinese Marxism. 46 As we will see in the case of Peru's Shining Path, the union of a universal ideology with unique national characteristics breathed life into a revolution that lacked a support base and a military strategy to put its revolution in motion. 47 Global Maoism and the Politics of Localization 13 49 Who were these masked revolutionaries? What was their message and purpose for such a surreptitious operation? The Communist Party of PeruShining Path, referred to hereafter as the Shining Path or Sendero for short, adopted Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guiding ideology and launched a full-fledged socialist revolution. The Chinese Communist Party defined pre-revolution China with terms such as "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial," which resonated with Latin American Marxists who regarded Latin America as sharing the same fate. 50 The perception that the Chinese revolution contained "lessons" for Latin American societies led intellectuals such as Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman Reynoso to embark on a patronage to Beijing where he studied Mao's works and trained in the military art of people's war. 51 Mao's principle of people's war provided the Shining Path with a way of fighting and a way of life that embodied "a vision of man and society and an approach to development built on foundations of popular participation and egalitarian values." 52 By the 1980s, the Shining Path consolidated itself as a Maoist organization and launched a protracted struggle that aimed-and almost succeeded-at toppling the Alberto Fujimori government in Lima. By no means is this paper trying to exonerate the Shining Path for their uses of violence and drug trafficking during and after the revolutionary struggle. Rather, the present study adopts scholarly neutrality to evaluate its case objectively. More recently, scholars have cast the Shining Path in a negative light for its use of terrorism, betrayal, illegal transnational cocaine trade, murder, and for allegedly betraying their peasant/indigenous constituency during the waning years of the People's War. However, these same scholars fall into a temporal trap by foregrounding these later more radicalized methods at the expense of giving due attention to Sendero's earlier policies of indigenous outreach. Seldom have scholars explored the much more compelling ways in which the Shining Path attained indigenous support through the appropriation of Jose Mariátegui's indigenismo policy of the 1920s and the evocation of Incan legends, culture, and history. 53 Sendero tried to base its revolution organically and on unique local conditions. For these reasons, the section examines the ways in which the Shining Path created a synthesis of Maoist precepts with Marategui's Peruvian socialism and Andean cultural norms.
Before exploring the Shining Path's localization, we must investigate the present scholarly arguments in the field of contemporary Peruvian history. Historians such as Olin Starn, Carlos Degregori, Robin Kirk, and Daniel
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Masterson assert that the Shining Path never truly reached out to the indigenous population. Among those few who argue otherwise, they also posit that the Shining Path betrayed the Andean peoples through top-down elitist treatment of indios and, in cases, violence directed against their indigenous followers. Starn, Degregori, and Kirk argue that the Shining Path's class-based ideology "is notable for a complete absence of appeals to 'Indian' or 'Andean' pride." 54 In fact, Starn argues that the Shining Path's ideology "eschewed completely any appeal to 'indigenous' or 'Andean' roots" while the Party's political culture focused almost exclusively on class struggle, anti-imperialism, and on the Party's primacy in revolution. 55 The same scholars also argue that the Shining Path "failed to build broad support among Peru's poor majorities" since their radical people's war in mountainous Ayachuco went down as "a gripping, yet historically doomed anachronism." 56 Degregori argues that the Shining Path's relationship with Peru's peasants was particularly ambiguous since the party took "a top down approach" to their treatment of peasant and indigenous recruits. 57 The Shining Path insisted that the Party had to serve the masses and bring them harmony, but had to "educate them and coerce them into support when necessary." 58 Alex Cook, meanwhile, asserts that the Shining Path "was supposed to be a creative acclimatization of Marxism to the Andean highlands," but instead "assimilated many of the same feudal and colonial social divides it had intended to destroy." 59 Nowhere is this more evident in the Shining Path's forcibly imposed "war planting schedule upon the villagers" and its serious disruption of their intricate agricultural cycle. 60 Thus as Degregori argues, Sendero was primarily a movement of intellectuals, left-of-center activists, and disillusioned Peruvian youths. 61 In the same vein, historian Daniel Masterson asserts that the Shining Path was "never a peasant-based insurgency" since the "strategic equilibrium" that Sendero Luminoso 62 hoped to achieve in the countryside "was never achieved because of the insurgency's misunderstanding and terrible abuse of the peasantry." 63 The Party's shift of the anti-government campaign to Peru's capital and largest urban center in Lima alienated much of the Shining Path leadership and "broke with Maoist principles." 64 Starn, meanwhile, argues that the gradual government withdrawal from the countryside "meant a cut off of modest outside support for projects like clinics, schools, and small irrigation projects." 65 Such led to the emergence of peasant self-defense brigades known as Rondas Campesinas. 66 As Peru's peasantry felt alienated and wanted to distance themselves from the radical Maoist movement due to the insurgency's destruction of Peru's rural infrastructure, many peasants organized into defense brigades to ward off Shining Path members from entering the villages. 67 Yet these scholars do not offer enough evidence to challenge the argu- Due to the Peruvian state's concerted effort to eradicate the "ethnic question" and its effort to turn its indigenous population into peasants, Peru's indigenous peoples had yet to form a strong national movement. 69 The Shining Path presented a new face to Peru's political culture that encouraged indigenous peoples to reject the subordinate status imposed on them for centuries. 70 The Ayachuco peasants embraced Guzman's version of Mariátegui's indigenismo and began to enlist members from various communities to fight for their cause.
In order to grasp the complexity of the Shining Path's localization, something must be said of Jose Carlos Mariátegui. In the late 1920s, Mariátegui, described as one of the "few original Marxist theoreticians Latin America has ever produced," established the Socialist Party of Peru. 71 Mariátegui recognized that Peru was a plagued country that suffered from semi-feudal and semi-colonial subordination at the same time. 72 While Marxian theory alienated world peasantries due to its focus on industrial sectors, Mariátegui centered his ideas on the "reality of Peruvian poverty, race, class conflict, and neo-colonialism." 73 He strongly believed that Peru offered a unique and interesting model for a groundbreaking form of Latin American socialism. 74 As Masterson notes, Mariátegui identified in the "reciprocal communalism of Andean social tradition" a form of "communism." 75 His communism was a great improvement over the highly "exploitative, individualistic, and foreign-dominated policies" that marginalized the indigenous peoples and stripped Peru of its burgeoning potential as a continental economic force. 76 Mariátegui thus saw the solution to Peru's semi-feudal and semi-colonial subjugation in the application of traditional Andean social models to a contemporary socialist Peruvian state. 77 One of the keys to understanding the importance of Mariátegui's indigenismo and further contributions to modern Peruvian socialism 78 is to "recognize his unique willingness to use traditional Andean social norms as a workable model" for Peru's current historical contexts. 79 The Peruvian Marxist asserted Galway 16 that traditional models of Andean socialism could be applied to modern contexts "if an efficient educational system emphasizing primary schooling for the masses, technical training, and a free and accessible university system was established as a foundation." 80 However, Mariátegui was not implying that Quechua 81 Indian society required westernization of any sort. Rather, he argued that the ayllu-a system of production and community that dates back to Incan timespreserves two great economic and social principles: to "contract workers collectively and to have the work performed in a relaxed and pleasant atmosphere of friendly competition." 82 Unfortunately, Mariátegui's uniquely Peruvian innovation led to his dismissal from the Comintern conference in 1929, and he died soon afterward. 83 Despite his political ex-communication and premature death, what are most important here are the ideas that Mariátegui set in motion. According to historian Lewis Taylor, Mao's concept of semi-feudal and semi-colonial society proved "highly compatible with Mariátegui's description of Peru in the first half of the twentieth century, with multiple coexisting worlds: indigenous peasant communities practicing primitive agrarian communism, colonial-era haciendas maintaining a feudal economy in the highlands, semi-feudal coastal estates producing crops for export, and bourgeois urbanites with ties to international capitalism." 84 Abimael Guzman Reynoso, the future head of the Shining Path, explained in an interview that the more he read Mao Zedong's works, the more he began to see Jose Carlos Mariátegui as a "first rate Marxist-Leninist who had thoroughly analyzed our [Peruvian] society." 85 Mariátegui's focus on forming a rural base from which to launch a revolution against the forces that prevented the advancement of Peru's indigenous peoples became central to the formation of the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path in the 1970s. It was not surprising, then, that Guzman appropriated Jose Mariátegui, a man who spoke out in favor of improving the standard of living of the Andean peoples, and reconciled his own fascination with Maoism to create a unique "sword of Marxism Leninism." Mariátegui ultimately provided the Shining Path with an analysis of Peru's society while Mao Zedong "provided the strategy to change it." 86 In 1970, a philosophy professor at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayachuco, Peru named Abimael Guzman Reynoso founded the "Shining Path"-a direct linguistic borrowing from Mariátegui's coining of the term "the Shining Path to the future" in reference to Marxism. 87 According to historian Olin Starn, Guzman arrived in Huamanga in 1962 from middle-class origins in the town of Mollendo. 88 Starn describes him as a "reserved yet self-confident man" who donned the Andean dress. 89 During the mid 1960s, Guzman became an admirer of Mao Zedong, toured China during the later years of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and received small arms training at a Chinese cadre school. 90 The Shining Path under Guzman's leadership broke from the Communist Party of Peru and embraced many of Mao's ideas, such as people's war, self-reliance, Third World anti-imperialism, and the Cultural Revolution. 91 These influences led Guzman to exclaim that the Shining Path's armed struggle required the mobilization of the peasants "under the infallible banners of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought." 92 Furthermore, Guzman's choice of Ayachuco as a base from which to launch the people's war revolution mirrors Mao's base in the remote Chingkanshan Mountains where he fought three successive revolutionary civil wars against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. 93 As Guzman's influence at the university waned, the Shining Path set up "popular schools" to "increase class-consciousness among the peasantry, working class, and students." 94 Guzman and his disciples highlighted the Peruvian state's corruption, its numerous failures and shortcomings, and Mariátegui's creative Marxist analysis of Peruvian society. 95 According to historians Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo, the "popular schools" emphasized the "need for class struggle, the incompetence of parliamentary democracy… [and] the Shining Path's plan for securing New Democracy." 96 Within a short period, Guzman gained a multifarious support base of former students and local peasants in the impoverished Ayachuco region and declared a war against Peru's wealthy bourgeoisie. 97 By the 1980s, the people's war had begun.
The Shining Path entered the first stage of Maoist revolution-agitation and propaganda-in late 1970. In true Maoist fashion, the Shining Path constructed their vanguard base on the backs of the country's peasantry. 98 The Shining Path called for a peasant rebellion against Peru's large landowners for oppressive policies that since the 1800s marginalized the Peruvian indigenous peoples. 99 With the election of Fernando Belaunde Terry in the early 1980s, newly reformed agricultural policies betrayed most of the country's agronomists in the southern highlands. 100 The Shining Path saw an opportunity to appeal to the victimized "Indian" and wedded the suffering of the indigenous people to the Party's revolutionary program, guerrilla army, and the new state they hoped to establish in Lima after the successful fifth stage of Maoist revolution. 101 The Andean peasants relied heavily on the notion of reciprocal economic justice and identified with the Shining Path because its operations "acted as a reflection, and an expression, of their own social and economic frustrations." 102 City dwellers paid very little for agricultural work and wealthy peasants did not make significant labor contributions. Thus, many peasants vehemently resented the upper classes. Through his use of respondent data from the Ayachuco region, historian Ronald Berg cogently argues that there was "considerable support" for killing the mostly-mestizo 103 Peruvian wealthy. 104 As a number of Andean peasants stated, "I have nothing against their killing the rich (los Galway 18 ricos)… I don't like it when they kill peasants (campesinos)." 105 One sympathizer stated that the men the Party killed "deserved what they got because they were rich, had two or three houses, and had acquired their wealth through unfair exchange." 106 Support for the Shining Path grew because the peasants and indigenous peoples believed that the party understood their aspirations, such as their desire to possess a measure of autonomy at the local level and the right to practice subsistence agriculture through land ownership. 107 As Berg elucidates, peasants held animosity toward Peru's wealthy and bought into the Shining Path's social program of improving indigenous rights.
Most importantly, the Shining Path exploited the cultural significance of Incan myths and Andean symbolism to broaden its revolutionary support base. 108 The Shining Path espoused elements of Quechua Indian culture, which historian Stefano Varese states "became increasingly evident" in the Party's activities. 109 The most culturally significant myth was that of Inkarri, which recalls a sixteenth century event where the Spanish colonizers dismembered, scattered, and buried the body of the last Incan sovereign Tupac Amaru I. 110 According to Arena and Arrigo, the Shining Path represented its leader Abimael Guzman as "the modern day incarnation of the Inkarri." 111 Sendero posters portrayed Guzman at the center "dressed in a suit, wearing glasses, [Mao's red] book in hand, surrounded by masses carrying rifles and flags, with the great red sun setting behind him." 112 Since Andean mythology held that the rise of the red sun meant the return of Inkarri, the Shining Path's Indian followers gave Guzman the Quechua title of "Red Sun:" pukainti. 113 The Shining Path's Andean followers revered their new "Inca king" with "God-Sun adoration" and entrusted his Party to bring the impoverished descendants of the great Incans to a more prosperous and respectful future. 114 Another weapon for widespread support was the evocation of Andean symbolism. The Spanish celebrated the execution of Tupac Amaru I and placed his head on a stake to discourage further indigenous uprisings. The Shining Path argued that Tupac Amaru's body, which stood as the quintessential Incan symbol for the dispersal of Indian tribes and the reverence of Incan cultural heroes, was slowly reconnecting in the forms of the Peruvian clandestine movements. As Varese, Arena, and Arrigo state, the Andean peoples believed that only when the desecrated head of Tupac Amaru I rejoins the rest of the body or grows its new body underground will the Inca nation rise up and obtain its pre-Columbian state of independence. 115 In addition, the Shining Path revolutionaries emphasized the 199 th anniversary of the Spanish execution of the Quechua Incan rebel Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui, immortalized in Incan legend as "Tupac Amaru II." 116 In the eighteenth century, Condorcanqui launched a bloody anti-colonial revolution.
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The victorious Spanish captured Condorcanqui and sentenced him to death in the same brutal manner that the Spanish had killed Tupac Amaru I centuries before. Thus, according to Varese, the Andean tradition "unites symbolically all other Indian revolutionary heroes, such as Tupac Amaru I (16 th century) and Tupac Amaru II (18 th century)." 117 After all, the Spanish ensured that the two indigenous leaders suffered the exact same symbolic fate of gruesome public dismemberment and disjointed burial across Peru's highlands. The Shining Path promised that only when all the indigenous peoples of Peru lent their support to Pukainti and his Shining Path movement shall Peru's "cosmic race" obtain their long sought after salvation. 118 Ultimately, the Shining Path's appropriation of indigenous cultural and traditional norms positioned the guerrilla organization in place to use "ethnic survival" as part of its aggressive recruitment strategies. 119 To summarize briefly the events that followed, the Shining Path completed the second, 120 third, 121 and fourth 122 stages of Maoist revolution between 1980 and 1988. 123 The people's war expanded, and by 1989, the guerrillas prepared to launch the people's war on Lima. 124 However, the fifth and final stage that entailed the fall of the cities was never achieved. Nevertheless, the Shining Path succeeded in launching "the largest insurgency on Peruvian soil since the Tupac Amaru II rebellion two centuries before." 125 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted that the armed conflict between 1980 and 2000 "constituted the most intense, extensive and prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the Republic." 126 As the people's war raged on, the Shining Path radicalized increasingly and launched brutal internal purges to ensure longevity and loyalty. Abimael Guzman, now named "Presidente Gonzalo," 127 took advantage of his personality cult status and taught his five thousand armed guerrillas that the Russians, Cubans, the Chinese, and North Koreans were "weak and not true Communists." 128 The Shining Path's official party ideology ceased to be "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," and instead became "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo thought." 129 But Peruvian forces captured the "great teacher" in 1992 and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Although the People's War continued in an ever-degenerating state, Abimael "Presidente Gonzalo" Guzman's incarceration and subsequent official statement from prison effectively ended the Maoist revolution in Peru. 130 These later developments have wrongfully been the focus of contemporary scholars on Sendero. While one cannot deny that the Shining Path was a violent and radical revolutionary movement, the Party succeeded in "localizing" 131 with the People's Republic of China and visited Beijing. 132 Maoist cadres soon flooded the now-Tanzanian 133 countryside and tirelessly promoted Mao Zedong Thought to African workers on the TANZARA 134 railway. 135 Yet Nyerere insisted upon the creation of a uniquely "African" socialism for his new nation. According to historian May Joseph, Nyerere's socialism was predicated on "a conscious anti-colonialist move to delink from the West's imperial obsessions" through which Tanzania "would create its own autonomy as a nation-state." 136 More specifically, Nyerere's national development project known as ujamaa aimed to transcend all existing social divisions in Tanzania. Yet ujamaa ended in disaster; the development program failed to increase productivity and merely reproduced many of the social divides it intended to eradicate. 137 This section examines the Tanzanian case as a counter example to Peru's Shining Path movement. According to historian Goran Hyden, Nyerere regarded ujamaa as an "attempt to base development efforts on an indigenous base instead of borrowing models and ideas from outside." 138 The section analyzes what Nyerere thought he was doing for his people with his invented African traditions and evaluates the debates on ujamaa by social democrat Cranford Pratt, Marxist scholars Issa Shivji and P.L. Raikes, political scientist Leander Schneider, and post-colonialists Goran Hyden, Jean Francois Bayart, and Michael Schatzberg. 139 The section then channels Abdul Rahman Babu's critique of African socialism to present Maoism-an oft-overlooked ideology given its emphasis on politicization-as an alternative framework and examines the ways in which Maoist precepts offer an insightful analysis to many of the socio-political detriments that plagued Tanzania during ujamaa villagization.
Before delving into the various analyses that are pertinent to this study, one must first examine the reasons why Maoism became a peripheral ideology in an independent Tanzania. Maoism was ever-present in Tanzanian society. Chinese supervisors expected Tanzanian laborers to be inspired by Mao, "to be determined, be afraid of no sacrifices, to reject all difficulties and to achieve total victory." 140 Historian Jamie Monson states that his colleague, Kim Jaycox, remembered that at the Chinese restaurant on the rooftop of the New Africa Hotel in Dar es Salaam, Chinese cadres distributed Mao's teachings and Mao
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buttons freely, and that "the back streets were filled with revolutionaries." 141 In addition, Chinese-trained Tanzanian university students offered instruction in small arms, explosives, and people's war guerrilla tactics to movements outside Tanzania, namely the FRELIMO movement in Mozambique. 142 So why did Nyerere and the TANU reject Maoism as an ideology in favour of invented "African" traditions? The TANU marginalized Maoism for two reasons. First, Nyerere was happily non-aligned and identified more with Fabian socialism and Catholic social teachings than any radical dogma. 143 Nyerere was a Christian and was raised and educated in the Western democratic tradition. 144 Furthermore, historians Bonnie Ibhawoh and J. Dibua assert that Nyerere's ideology fused European concepts derived from Kantian liberalism with an ethos inspired by his idealized communitarian native African society. 145 Nyerere never wanted to sacrifice the ethic of individualism and firmly believed in the people's right to elect their own representatives. 146 Second, Nyerere's major government officials were, for the most part, anti-communist and antidogmatic. Prime Minister Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa, Vice President Abeid Amani Karume, Junior Minister R. Wambura, and Foreign Affairs and Defense minister Oscar Kambona were all statists that rejected any form of ideological extremism. In fact, Kambona initially opposed ujamaa villagization in favor of a more pragmatic approach. 147 In sum, these factors caused Maoism to become peripheral in Nyerere's and the TANU's ideological pursuits.
In order to grasp the complexity of the scholarly debates on ujamaa, something must be said about Nyerere's vision for rural development in Tanzania. Following Nyerere's 5 February 1967 Arusha Declaration, 148 the Tanzanian government put in motion its President's "African" socialist rural development plan. 149 Although villagization began in the early 1960s as part of a strategy to break Tanganyikan dependency on Britain, total collectivization did not begin until Nyerere published "Socialism and Rural Development." 150 Nyerere based his vision for socio-economic reorganization on his idealized perception of traditional pre-colonial African family life, which he named ujamaa for "extended family." 151 Central features of the ujamaa communes were mutual respect, shared property, obligatory labor, and self-reliance. 152 Nyerere stated that in traditional African life "the people were equal, they cooperated together, and they participated in all the decisions which affected their lives." 153 However, it must be stressed here that Nyerere's idea of pre-colonial African society was an invented tradition that merely drew inspiration from ideas of traditional life and not actualized traditional methods. 154 He merely constructed an idyllic "African essence" which he marketed to his people as tradition.
The Arusha Declaration outlined the ways in which this new "traditionally inspired" system would come to "dominate the rural economy and set the Galway 22 social pattern for the country as a whole." 155 As Elisabeth Croll states, in an ujamaa village system "all but the individual household plot is farmed communally." 156 Even though this system was one of "shared poverty," Nyerere aspired to modernize the traditional ujamaa structure to suit the country's demand for a vastly improved standard of living. 157 To accomplish this end, the Tanzanian President encouraged his people to form economic and social communities "where people live together and work together for the good of all, and which are interlocked so that all of the different communities also work together in cooperation for the common good of the nation as a whole." 158 Nyerere also wanted to provide more accessible government services such as schools, medical services, water, agricultural officers, and transport facilities to Tanzania's rural peoples in addition to increasing agricultural production. 159 While Nyerere believed that ujamaa cooperative villages would break the colonial era "dependency" trend of the production of export crops, there remains a considerable debate on whether ujamaa succeeded in improving the peasants' standard of living and breaking Tanzania's dependency lifeline on foreign sources. 160 Social democratic historian Cranford Pratt supports what Nyerere thought he was doing in Tanzania with ujamaa villagization. 161 Pratt posits that any assessment of Nyerere's socialism must recognize his commitments to Tanzanian economic development, national control, participatory democracy, and equality. 162 Pratt provides four reasons to support Nyerere's Tanzanian socialism. First, Pratt endorses Nyerere's moral concern over the techniques used to achieve a "unique" socialism. Pratt argues that Nyerere implemented leadership rules to "provide a modern and relevant application" of perceived traditional African values while seeking to exalt equality and root out colonial era social distinctions. 163 Second, Nyerere devoted himself to socialist ideals without revolution, a military coup, or electoral victory. Third, Nyerere attempted to develop this socialism along egalitarian, socialist, and democratic lines. According to Pratt, Nyerere "chose socialism" primarily because it was in Tanzania's "best interest to pursue development along socialist lines." 164 Pratt asserts that by stressing individual liberty, Nyerere succeeded in eliminating the gulf between the rural peasants, urban working class, and government elite. 165 In essence, Nyerere knew that the country "would long be poor and that the building of a just society would become vastly more difficult if ever class differences were entrenched." 166 Fourth, Nyerere's socialist ideology is genuinely indigenous and not an adaptation of a foreign dogma. Pratt lauds Nyerere's qualities, such as his nationalism, opposition to African oppression, and anti-dogmatism, as vehicles that led him to find a workable alternative to the industrialized states' "neo-liberal policies." 167 In contrast, Marxists Issa Shivji and P.L. Raikes contest Pratt's asser-
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tions through analyses of Africa based upon Western capitalism and its development from European feudalism. 168 While Pratt is correct to state that no classical class divisions ever existed at the national level, Shivji argues that the system of social production in Africa is an essential cog in the world capitalist scheme. 169 He posits that capitalism has taken on a completely different form in Africa, which negatively affected the formation of the rural peasantry. 170 He states that the introduction of "cash crops" to Tanganyika "set in motion the process of differentiation within the peasantry." 171 Although some peasants protected their interests by "fraternizing with the bureaucracy," internal and external dominating classes took advantage and exploited the poor peasants. 172 Because of this dual domination, the worker-peasant alliance emerges from "an analysis of both the working class and poor peasantry in relation to other classes, from their role in social production, and their objective interests in conflict with imperialism and its local class allies." 173 These already entrenched class differences, struggles, and alliances "require indispensably a political organization" based on a proletarian class-consciousness, which Pratt argues, does not exist. 174 In the same vein, Raikes asserts that Tanzania "is a class society" since the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" 175 is and has been entrenched since independence. 176 Nyerere intended his development plan to be a "strategy of disengagement from the world capitalist system" since a state that failed to nourish its populace was powerless, dependent, and "potentially vulnerable to the dictates of others." 177 However, nationalized ujamaa property fell into "the jaws of a deeply venal class of vibwanyenye," a Swahili term for the bourgeoisie. 178 This same bourgeoisie that administered Tanzania's affairs also "distrusted the peasants' intentions and capabilities" since democratically controlled ujamaa villages posed "a real threat to their status" and "threaten[ed] their control." 179 Hyden supports this claim, arguing that the petty-bourgeoisie in Africa "is clearly anxious, like any other class, to create a power base of its own and defend it." 180 Therefore, Tanzania's ujamaa policies must be regarded as a concerted effort on behalf of the ruling class to protect their high-class status.
In opposition, Marxist readings of ujamaa that lambaste the bureaucratic bourgeoisie fail to recognize the antagonistic relationship between the peasantry and other classes. 181 As Hyden notes, African peasants are self-sufficient and have considerable control over the means of agricultural production. 182 Due to their near-total disconnection from the core, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's dependence on peasant production causes its members to focus on the acquisition of outside capital to reverse the relationship of dependency. Ujamaa failed, in Hyden's view, because the peasant mode of production was "far too narrow for a rapid socialist transformation." Thus peasants became "unwilling and unable" in their insurmountable struggle to meet the demands of capitalism. 183 
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Political scientist Leander Schneider and historians Jean Francois Bayart and Michael Schatzberg emphasize vertical leadership, paternalism, and displays of excessive force. Schneider emphasizes the negative repercussions of the TANU's elitist attitude and use of compulsion-explored further later on in this section-when it forcefully relocated Tanzania's rural population. Despite arguing that ujamaa villagization was "throughout a well-intentioned policy," he states that the method of villagization "was coercive and top-down, and it is generally agreed that it did not improve the majority of rural Tanzanians' lot, as had been hoped." 184 Furthermore, the TANU's adoption of coercive methods "points to the authoritarian side of Nyerere's rule." 185 The use of persuasion, inducements, and compulsion to ensure the successful experimentation of ujamaa vijijini reveals the ways in which the TANU elites and state officials regarded the rural peoples as "backward, ignorant, and-in some instances-even 'savage.'" 186 In essence, the TANU's "developmentalist hierarchy" failed to raise the rural population's standard of living and widened the gulf between the "civilized us" and the "backwards them."
In addition, Bayart and Schatzberg emphasize the vertical nature of post-colony rule in Africa. Bayart's study focuses on African rulers' monopolization of resources, namely food. Bayart refers to post-colonial African politics as the "politics of the belly: the idea of accumulation, opening up possibilities of social mobility, nepotism, corruption, and other methods of dominance that allow the holder of power to 'set himself up.'" 187 Schatzberg refines Bayart's "politics of the belly" by arguing that the center's distribution of the resources serves as an important locus of their legitimacy as the "fatherchief." 188 Schatzberg posits that a "moral matrix of legitimate governance," which is fundamentally rooted in paternalistic/maternalistic rhetoric, propaganda, and metaphors, forms the basis of the "belly politics" of Bayart's groundbreaking study. 189 For example, a Swahili poem praised Nyerere for being the "first person to respond to the needs of the people" and compared the nation to an "infant wishing to be breastfed." 190 Even though Nyerere's "African" socialist ideology and hardworking personality seemed incompatible with such metaphorical imagery, the way he ruled Tanzania reflected his inner paternalism. 191 The appreciation or depreciation of Nyerere's ujamaa ultimately depends on what aspect of the socio-economic policy scholars choose to highlight. Pratt's appreciation of Nyerere's ideas ignores the effects of its practice on the ground. Class divides existed and the feudal nature of the core-periphery relationship took the form of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal elite-peasant cleavage. However, strictly Marxist readings that lambaste the bureaucratic bourgeoisie tend to overlook the antagonistic relationship between the peasantry and other classes in Africa. 192 The peasants' self-sufficiency and control over the means of subsistence resulted in the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's dependence on Global Maoism and the Politics of Localization 25 peasant production and, therefore, caused them to turn to outside capital to alleviate this constriction. 193 This argument, however, fails to identify the paternalistic nature of rule in post-colonial Africa. Nyerere positioned himself as the "fatherchief " and his government adopted a "top-down" attitude towards the "national children," which was embodied in Tanzania's millions of peasants. Despite their differences, these scholars agree that ujamaa was a complete and total failure. Yet it is bizarre that with this consensus over ujamaa's failings, Maoism is not drawn attention to as an insightful analysis to mete out the plagues of Nyerere's failed socio-economic program. Maoism was certainly pervasive enough to circulate throughout work sites and universities in Tanzania. Why have scholars devoted so little attention to Maoism in this regard? Is it due to its heavily politicized nature? This paper sheds light on Maoist precepts, namely Mao's notions of voluntarism, self-reliance, and a worker-peasant alliance-all central to Babu's critique of Nyerere in particular and African socialism in general-as serious insights to the socio-economic issues that ujamaa failed to extinguish. 194 Mao Zedong's philosophical approach to Marxian analyses of society held practice, human experience, and human will as primaries. Mao placed "the superstructure" over "the base" as the "location of the motor of history." 195 In particular, Mao's notion of voluntarism, which held human will at its core, inspired many willing participants during China's Great Leap Forward period. Contrary to Marxian theory, which came down firmly "on the side of economic determinism" through the emphasis of development as the cause of social change, Mao advocated that the "human factor" was truly the primary driver for such a transformation. 196 Mao's theory of voluntarism, in particular, rather than Marx's premise of economic determinism in general, revealed the Chinese leader's dependence on a revolutionary spirit within his people. 197 Mao's transformation of many of China's rural areas into communal places of life and work utilized a voluntaristic approach in which the peasants "were not alienated" but encouraged to "stride forward on their own." 198 Mao thus created alternatives to old and corrupt institutions and eventually won the "voluntary enthusiastic support" of the vast majority of the Chinese people. 199 In the same vein, Schneider points out that Nyerere and the TANU initially regarded voluntarism, democratic principles, and local control as important "means to the end of the successful achievement of the material goals of development." 200 Nyerere acknowledged voluntarism and local power as important cogs in the moving wheels of ujamaa vijijini. 201 However, the reach of such ideas was very limited. 202 On the ground, the communalization efforts proved to be nothing more than a subterfuge for grouping peasants together to conveniently and cost-efficiently facilitate various social services through total collectivization, such as water, education, and seed distribution. 203 Nyerere then launched Galway 26 "Operation Rufiji" and "Operation Dodoma" in 1970, both of which forcefully moved whole populations in those regions into planned villages if they refused to cooperate. 204 The TANU's enforced settlement of the majority of Tanzania's rural population into seven thousand villages began in 1968 and the Party considered the program "complete" by 1975. 205 By 1973, ujamaa villagization forced the resettlement of "seventy percent of the country's rural population to 'planned villages.'" 206 As production slowed and the peasantry wavered in its commitment, Nyerere launched "Operation Tanzania" later that year. The mass relocation plan, described by historian Kelly Askew as the "largest on the African continent," called for the relocation of the entire rural population in Tanzania to ujamaa villages. 207 The program veered toward disaster near the end of 1975, thus the TANU "severed the final thread with ideals of voluntarism" and embraced harsher forms of compulsion as methods to force the ujamaa plan along. 208 TANU forces destroyed the houses and used excessive methods of compulsion to force ninety-one percent of Tanzania's peasantry into villages. 209 In addition, Nyerere called on the people of Tanzania to "have great confidence in themselves" and to preserve Tanzania's autonomy. 210 However, the Tanzanian President later stated that eventually, the people "will lose their enthusiasm and will look upon the independence government as simply another new ruler." 211 Furthermore, Nyerere asserts that the people "will then sink back into apathy -until the next time someone is able to convince them that their own efforts can lead to an improvement in their lives." 212 Nyerere's ujamaa villagization soldiered on in spite of heavy socio-economic costs. The end result was a massive increase in Tanzania's debt, strained relations between the urban and rural peoples, as well as between Tanzania and its international donors, and created a huge crisis in the country's balance of payment deficits to foreign contributors. It is for these reasons that an examination of the notion of self-reliance is particularly salient. 213 During the anti-imperialist struggle against invading Japanese forces, Mao stated the importance of China's own national resources and its role as the fuel of the people's revolution. He asserted that China stood for self-reliance and that although the country "hope[d] for foreign aid [it] cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people." 214 Mao wholeheartedly believed that China's policy should rest on its own strength, and that meant "regeneration through [its] own efforts." 215 As we can see, Mao believed that the workers, peasants, and working intellectuals created the wealth of a society. Furthermore, three of these important strata had to work collectively to provide for the revolution in its continuance while making use only of China's national resources. 216 By relying on one's own strength, nations of the Third World could shed their dependency and reclaim the mandate to rule their own lands. 217 In Tanzania, Nyerere promoted the notion of self-reliance as one of the major themes of the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration and ujamaa. Nyerere stressed the idea of self-reliance in the early 1960s, but he did not employ the term until June 1965, after Chinese Foreign Minister and Premier Zhou En-lai's visit to Dar es Salaam. 218 The Nyerere Government also emphasized the many dangers of dependence on foreign aid and encouraged self-reliance as the only viable solution to Tanzania's socio-economic development. 219 However, the TANU modified ujamaa to "conform closely [to] the preconceptions and interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who controlled its implementation." 220 Nyerere encouraged no "class struggle against the internal and external classes with vested interests in maintaining and perpetuating the existing relations of production." Instead, many planned villages "were entirely integrated into the previous dependency pattern of production of export crops." 221 Rather than produce surpluses for the peasants, ujamaa villagization facilitated the strenuous production of surplus for capitalist buyers in the developed world. 222 As a result, Nyerere's ujamaa never developed a full-fledged plan for the overall transformation of the economy. Thus, ujamaa reinserted Tanzania's peasant communities into the dependency economy of colonization and turned the rural peasant population into a massive production force for outsider wants and needs. 223 As for Mao's notion of a worker-peasant alliance, the Chinese Chairman always championed the cause of peasant revolution and, as China became more industrialized, made room for the proletariat to emerge as the vanguard class in China. Although Mao's decision to adopt a universalist brand of thought alienated his international followers from rural peasant-class societies, his advocacy for a worker-peasant alliance eliminated the gulf between the urban and agrarian masses. 224 Historian Stuart Schram states that Mao did not tie his viewpoint "to the interests of a single class at a single time," but was "most passionately concerned with the fate of the Chinese nation, and moreover with its fate throughout all eternity." 225 Mao stated in a 1949 speech that the "people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 percent of China's population." 226 Thus, a worker-peasant alliance exercised a dictatorship over the reactionary classes who resisted socialist transformation and construction. 227 One of Tanzania's most pressing endeavors was to try to diminish the gulf between rural and urban peoples and the areas in which they lived. Historian John Saul argues that this was the Arusha Declaration's "most important aim" and the Mwogonzo guidelines in 1971 "provided ideological form for Galway 28 efforts to activate the necessary mass base of Tanzania's socialism." 228 Despite explicitly advocating that the reason for the ujamaa policy was the need to thwart the oppressive and reactionary classes, Nyerere and the Tanzanian Government never consolidated an alliance between the proletariat and peasantry. 229 Instead, the Tanzanian President encouraged the maintenance of "reactionary and divisive classes" in ujamaa villages. 230 Nyerere stated that Tanzanian peasants and workers "must not… persecute the progressive farmers… Instead we must seek their cooperation, and integrate them into the new socialist agriculture." 231 Under this stipulation, the wealthy peasants, known as kulaks, could maintain their stranglehold on rural production. 232 Therefore, Nyerere failed to narrow the gap between the rich and poor, urban and rural classes in Tanzanian society.
Conclusion
Would Maoism be a catchall solution for all post-colonial quandaries? This paper has made clear the effectiveness of Mao's principles, but does not assume that such efficacy can be completely transposed to every country's particular conditions. However, Mao's precepts succeeded in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial case of Peru. The Shining Path localized Mao Zedong's principles by combining them with Peru's particular cultural forms. The Party also appropriated Mariátegui's notion of indigenismo to consolidate further support from Quechua peoples. Sendero gained strong peasant support in their millenarian struggle against the Peruvian government by extolling the importance of Andean culture and symbolism, by promoting the advancement of indigenous rights, and by tracing threads between the present struggle and past Peruvian attempts to end the unjust oppression of the Peruvian people. Contemporary scholars may fall into a temporal trap by merely foregrounding the fact that the Peruvian Maoists resorted to terrorism, cocaine trafficking, and extreme violence in their waning years of resistance, but the Shining Path successfully confronted the crooked Peruvian Government and made concerted efforts to improve the indigenous peoples' and peasants' standards of living.
In the Tanzanian case, however, Nyerere and the Tanzanian Government sought to forge a unique political ideology based on Nyerere's idealized version of traditional "African" notions of family and community. Nyerere's socialism-embodied in his socio-economic program of ujamaa vjijinisought to shatter Tanzania's chain of dependency and to create a country that was productive, self-reliant, and egalitarian. While Mwalimu's ideas were remarkable, what actually happened on the ground was a total disaster. Thus, ujamaa exacerbated existing societal divisions, overworked the peasantry, reified the gulf between urban and rural, and effectively threw the country into a form of cyclical neo-colonial dependency. To conclude, the Peruvian case and the Tanzanian counter-example provide insight into the importance of global Maoism, the difGlobal Maoism and the Politics of Localization 29 ficulty in reconciling theory and practice, and the efficacy of "particularizing the universal" in settings disparate of its origin. things that oppose each other also complement each other), which shows an effort to blend China's particularities with Marx's universality. 5 Indigenismo: A Latin American social movement that pressed for an improved standard of living for the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Indigenismo also sought to grant a greater socio-political role for Indigenous peoples and the demanded a more steadfast recognition of indigenous rights and including compensation and reconciliation. 6 Andean cultural and traditional norms: these include reciprocal justice, subsistence communal agriculture, the Inkarri myth, Pankainti, and the messianic notion of reuniting all the Andean peoples in a millenarian uprising against the state. 7 Also referred to as ujamaa vijijini, Nyerere asserted that "we need to develop defined and redefined to the point of nearly rendering the group as useless. Allen Isaacman argues that many have grappled "with the idea of the development of peasantries, analyzing such broader processes as the uneven capitalist penetration of the countryside, the growth of commodity production, the restructuring of gender and household relations, and the development of oscillating peasant workers." He cautions historians to avoid categorization and praises Africanists for paying greater attention to the voices of a varying degree of peasants. These voices, he declares, "need to be listened to critically and carefully, precisely because there is no authentic voice or transcending unity that structured the diverse experiences of African peasantries." By placing the focus on different peasantries and how they negotiate their positions in relation to the labor process, he asserts, we emphasize the fact that peasants subsist as "part of a larger social order, in which ruling class agendas, state politics, and international markets impinge on their daily lives and subsume a portion of their labor." Allen F. Isaacman, "Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa," 
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